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Abstract
We analyze the equilibrium size of networks under alternative market structures. Networks are
characterized by positive size externalities (commonly called "network externalities"). That is,
the benefits of the addition of an extra node (or an extra customer) exceed the private benefits
accruing to the particular node (or customer). A direct consequence of this demand structure is
that perfect competition does not implement the optimal outcome. Because of the externality,
there exists a range of prices within which three different network sizes can be supported as
equilibria: a zero size network, an intermediate size that is unstable, and a large stable and Pareto
optimal one. We expect that the market will select the largest of the three equilibrium networks.
As a result, small networks will not observed. We call critical mass the size of the smallest
network that can be supported in equilibrium. Alternative allocation systems internalize the
network externality to different degrees, and therefore result in a variety of sizes of critical
masses and price-network size paths. A welfare-maximizing planner supports a larger network
than results in perfect competition. Surprisingly, a monopolist, even if allowed to influence
consumers’ expectations, always chooses a network of smaller size than in perfect competition.
Oligopolists of compatible network goods support networks of smaller size than perfect
competition and larger than monopoly. We extend our results to durable goods in a dynamic
setting. In the presence of a downward time trend for industry marginal cost, the presence of
network externalities increases the speed at which market demand grows. We use this prediction
to calibrate the model and obtain estimates of the parameter measuring a consumer’s valuation
of the installed base (i.e., the network effect) using aggregate time series data on prices and
quantities in the US fax market.
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Critical Mass and Network Size
with Application to the US FAX Market
1. Introduction
Network industries are common. Among them one can name telephony, electricity,
roadways, railroads, and facsimiles. A central feature of networks is that an increase of sales of
network services through the expansion of the network creates external (not market-mediated)
benefits for other buyers (network participants) because the creation of new goods affects directly
and positively the utility function of every participant. The resulting consumption economies of
scope are called direct network externalities.1,2
Industries with network externalities typically exhibit a positive critical mass -- i.e., small
networks are not observed at any price. This is a central feature of network industries and is
likely to be present in a variety of market structures or allocation mechanisms. However, the
presence of network externalities and critical mass have significant repercussions for the analysis
of conduct, market structure, and performance, and these will be the focus of this paper.
We construct a general model of network externalities and establish conditions for the
existence of critical mass under perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly, and welfare
maximization. When we compare the resulting prices and network sizes for these market
structures, we find that perfect competition is inefficient, provides a smaller than optimal
network, and does not decentralize the welfare-maximizing solution. We further find that a
monopolist who is able to influence expectations will generally choose to create a smaller
network than would result under perfect competition. The same is true for oligopolists producing
compatible goods.
1 Non-network industries that produce complementary (vertically-related) components
typically exhibit indirect network externalities as the addition of new varieties of one type of
components affect positively but indirectly the utility of all participants through the reduction of
prices.
2 Economides and White (1994) distinguish between two-way networks, one-way networks,
and industries of compatible vertically-related components.
2We next extend our results to a dynamic setting and to durable goods. With perfectly
elastic supply, the durable goods problem can be reduced to a single-period problem. With
inelastic supply, we characterize the equilibrium network paths. In the final section, we present
an analysis of the market for facsimile machines as an example of an emerging network,3 and
we show how time series data on prices and quantities can be used to estimate the value of the
network externality.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
analyzes the existence of critical mass and its size for different ownership structures.
Specifically, section 3.1 analyzes perfect competition, section 3.2 discusses welfare maximization,
section 3.3 discusses monopoly and section 3.4 discusses oligopoly. Section 4 discusses
dynamics for non-durable and durable goods under perfect competition and the applies the
analysis to the U.S. FAX market. Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2. The Model
We first analyze a static one-period world. Our model captures the existence of network
externalities through expectations that are fulfilled at equilibrium. We assume that consumers
expect a network of size ne which we normalize to be between 0 and 1, 0 ≤ ne ≤ 1. We define
a network externalities function that captures the influence of network size expectations on the
willingness to pay for the good provided through the network.4 Let the network externalities
3 Our analysis is complementary to the extensive literature on network externalities and
the traditional applied analysis of specific networks such as telecommunications and electricity.
4 See Economides and White (1994) among others for a justification of the emergence of
network externalities. In industries of complementary goods (network industries or otherwise)
the addition of new components may directly affect positively the utility of consumers or may
indirectly enhance the value of goods already provided in the network. As a rule, direct effects
occur in two-way networks, such as telephone and road networks, where reciprocity is present
(a phone call from A to B is distinct from a phone call from B to A, and they are both feasible
and demanded) and consumers are identified with network nodes. Indirect network externalities
typically occur in one-way networks (such as an Automatic Teller Machine network) where two
3function be h(ne) = k + δf(ne). Here, k gives the value of the good in the absence of network
effects, δ is an indicator function taking the value 1 if there are network externalities, and f(ne)
measures the network effect. We normalize by setting f(0) = 0, so that a network of size 0 has
no effect on willingness to pay. Since the externalities are positive, we assume f′(.) > 0, so that
larger expected sizes of networks give higher individual utility. We also assume f′′(.) ≤ 0, so that
the marginal network externality is not increasing in network size.
We assume that for a consumer indexed by y, the willingness to pay for one unit of the
good in a network of expected size ne is u(y, ne) = yh(ne).5 Let the cumulative distribution
function of types be G(y). We assume that G(y) is continuous with positive density G′(y)
everywhere on its support, which is normalized to be [0, 1].6,7 Given expectations ne and
price p, the index y* = m(p, ne) of the marginal consumer is the value y that solves u(y, ne)
= p. If price is so low that all consumers wish to purchase, then there is no interior solution, and
y = 0. Similarly, at very high prices, y = 1. More formally,
 0 if p/h(ne) < 0y* ≡ m(p, ne) =  p/h(ne) otherwise (1) 1 if p/h(ne) > 1.
different types of components (ATM machines and Bank accounts) are combined to create a
demanded good, and reciprocity is not present. The analysis of one-way networks also applies
to markets with compatible components and markets of vertically-related goods in general.
5 The multiplicative specification allows different types of consumers to receive differing
values of "network externality" from the same network. Our assumption diverges from most of
the literature (Katz and Shapiro (1985), Cabral (1990), Economides (1995)), which uses an
additive utility specification, so that all consumers receive the same benefit from the same
network.
6 It follows that the inverse G-1(n) exists for n ∈ [0, 1].
7 We intentionally allow the existence of some types of consumers (of low y) who have
little or no use for the good provided through the network.
4Given expectations and price, all consumers with indices higher than y ≥ y* buy the good, so
that the size of the network at price p is,
n = 1 - G(y*) = 1 - G(m(p, ne)). (2)
This defines the demand for the network good at price p. Since G(.) is strictly monotonic, its
inverse exists, and, when 0 ≤ p/h(n) ≤ 1, we can write the willingness to pay for the last
consumer in a network of size n with expectations ne as
p(n, ne) = h(ne)G-1(1 - n), (3)
Seen as a function of its first argument, this is just an inverse demand function, and therefore,
p1 = - h/G′ < 0.8
Because of network externalities, expectations affect positively the willingness to pay,
p2 = h′G-1(1 - n) > 0.
3. Critical Mass
For normal goods that do not exhibit network externalities, demand slopes downward;
as price decreases, more of the good is demanded. This fundamental relationship may fail in
goods with network externalities. For network goods, the willingness to pay for the last unit
increases as the number expected to be sold increases. If expected sales rises with actual sales,
then in equilibrium the willingness to pay for the last unit may increase with the number of units
sold. Thus, for goods with network externalities, the (fulfilled expectations) demand-price
schedule may not slope downward everywhere. In such markets, as costs decrease (in the
comparative statics sense) we may observe discontinuous expansions in sales rather than the
8 Subscript i in pi indicates the derivative with respect to the ith argument of the function.
5smooth expansion along a downward slopping demand curve. In particular, we may observe a
discontinuous start of the network: as costs decrease, the network starts with a significant market
coverage (say 10% of the market) rather than starting with 0.1% coverage.
Critical mass, denoted by n0, is defined as the smallest network size that can be sustained
in equilibrium. We will argue that, for many network goods, the critical mass is of significant
size, and therefore for these goods small market coverage will never be observed -- either the
market does not exist or it has significant coverage.
The concept of critical mass formalizes the "chicken and the egg" paradox: many
consumers are not interested in purchasing the good because the installed base is too small, and
the installed base is too small because an insufficiently small number of consumers have
purchased the good. Thus, consumers’ expectations of no network good provision may be
fulfilled. However, for a range of costs, expectations of positive level(s) of sales of the network
good are also fulfilled. Often, there are multiple fulfilled expectations equilibria. Consumers and
producers can coordinate to reach any one of them. We will assume that they will reach the
equilibrium of the largest network size. Thus, when more than one network size is supported by
the same price, we select as the equilibrium the highest network size supported by that price; this
network size Pareto dominates the other network sizes supported by the same price.
In equilibrium, expectations are fulfilled so that n = ne.9 Thus, the mapping
p(n, n) = h(n)G-1(1 - n). (4)
defines the price level that supports an equilibrium network of size n. Alternatively, equation
(4) can be thought of as defining the size(s) of the network that can be supported by a fulfilled
expectations equilibrium for a given price, i.e., as defining the fulfilled expectations demand.
Figure 1 shows the construction of a typical fulfilled expectations demand. The curves
9 See Katz and Shapiro (1985).
6p(n, n1e) and p(n, n2e) show the willingness to pay, given different sizes of the installed base
Figure 1: Construction of a fulfilled expectations demand p(n, n).
that consumers expect to emerge in equilibrium, where n2e > n1e. The point labeled E1 on the
first curve represents the point at which n equals n1e, and analogously, E2 on the second curve
represents the point at which n equals n2e. The locus of all such points traces out the fulfilled
expectations demand curve. Observe that the fulfilled expectations demand p(n, n) is not
monotonic. Also note that, in addition to the prices indicated by the inverted-U shaped curve in
Figure 1, the fulfilled expectations demand curve p(n, n) also includes the entire vertical axis
at zero, as indicated by the thicker line. This is because at any marginal cost c > k a network
7of zero size is a fulfilled expectations equilibrium (Figure 1 is drawn for the special case when
k = 0; the general cases are shown in Figure 2). Thus, in general, the fulfilled expectations
demand consists of the vertical axis above k and the inverted-U curve that starts at k.
3.1 Perfect Competition
Let the market for the network good or service be perfectly competitive and let the
constant marginal cost be c. In a perfectly competitive environment, firms set price equal to
marginal cost and offer an infinitely elastic supply. Therefore, in equilibrium,
p(n, n) = c. (5)
To determine the critical mass of a network, we analyze the shape of the fulfilled expectations
demand p(n, n), defined by equation (4). We begin by establishing the value of p(n, n) at the
corners. First note that the marginal consumer is willing to pay k ≥ 0 at a fulfilled expectations
equilibrium network of size zero, and is willing to pay zero when the network size is one.
Formally,
limn→0 p(n, n) = kG-1(1) = k ≥ 0, limn→1 p(n, n) = 0,
since limn→0 h(n) = k, G-1(1) = 1 and G-1(0) = 0. The second limit says that to achieve a very
large size, a network has to include even consumers of very low willingness to pay.
The slope of the fulfilled expectations demand p(n, n) is,10
dp(n, n)/dn = p1 + p2 = - h(n)/G′ + h′(n)G-1(1 - n). (6)
The first term measures the slope of the inverse demand disregarding the effects of expectations.
The second term captures the effect of a marginal increase in the expected size of the network
10 This can also be found by implicitly differentiating equation (2) with respect to n after
substituting ne = n. Then, 1 = -G′(p′/h - ph′/h2) ⇔ p′ = ph′/h - h/G′ = G-1(1 - n)h′ - h/G′,
where p′ = dp/dn and h′ = dh/dn, and we used the rule dG-1(x)/dx = 1/G′(G-1(x)).
8on the marginal consumer, i.e., the increase in the willingness to pay of the last subscriber to the
network created by his action in joining the network. If the network gets very large, the last
consumer joining the network has a very low willingness to pay for it. Therefore, for very large
networks, the effect of marginal expectations on the marginal consumer is negligible, i.e.,
limn→1 p2 = limn→1 h′(n)G-1(1 - n) = 0.
It follows that for large n, the slope of p(n, n) is negative,
limn→1 dp(n, n)/dn = limn→1 p1 + limn→1 p2 = limn→1 p1 = -h(1)G′(1) < 0.
The sign of limn→0 dp(n, n)/dn depends on the values of the parameters of the market and is of
crucial importance.
We assume that p(n, n) is quasi-concave, i.e., single-peaked. Since we have showed
that, for large n, p(n, n) is decreasing, there are only two possibilities: either it is increasing for
small n, and decreasing for large n (inverted U or bell-shaped); or it is decreasing for all n.
The network has a positive critical mass if and only if p(n, n) is increasing in n in the
neighborhood of n = 0, i.e., if limn→0 dp/dn > 0. In this case, the function p(n, n) is depicted
on the left panel of Figure 2. Furthermore, p(n, n) is increasing for small n, reaches a
maximum at n0, and eventually decreases for large n. The critical mass is the size of the
network n0 that corresponds to the maximum of p(n, n). Let c0 ≡ p0 ≡ p(n0, n0). At a network
of critical mass size, the two opposite effects of a marginal increase in n on willingness to pay
are exactly counterbalanced.
For high levels of marginal cost (and therefore price) c > c0, no consumer is willing to
buy the good, and therefore the network does not exist. For c = c0, the network appears with
a positive size n0. For c < c0, there are two network sizes that are consistent with equation (4).
This is not surprising because of the self-supporting nature of the network expansion. Following
our convention, we will take the equilibrium size of the network to be the largest of the solutions.
9Thus, as marginal cost decreases below p0, the equilibrium network size follows the outer branch
Figure 2: The fulfilled expectations demand with strong and weak network
externalities.
of p(n, n).
Lemma 1: Under perfect competition, a network exhibits a positive critical mass if
and only if limn→0 dp(n, n)/dn > 0.
The market does not have a positive critical mass when limn→0 dp(n, n)/dn < 0. Such a
case is depicted in Figure 2(b), where the function p(n, n) is decreasing for all n. The
following theorem describes conditions on the extent of the network externality and the
distribution of types under which networks have critical mass.
Theorem 1: A network has a positive critical mass if either (i) k = 0, i.e., the utility
of every consumer in a network of zero size is zero, or (ii) limn→0 h′(n) is sufficiently
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large, i.e., there are immediate and large external benefits to network expansion for
very small networks, or (iii) G′(1) is sufficiently large, i.e, there is a significant
density of high-willingness-to-pay consumers who are just indifferent on joining a
network of approximately zero size.
In general,
limn→0 dp(n, n)/dn = limn→0 h′ - limn→0 h/G′(1) = δ(limn→0 f′) - k/G′(1). (7)
Given Lemma 1, the existence of a positive critical mass requires the necessary and sufficient
condition that limn→0 dp(n, n)/dn > 0. As the Theorem describes, there are three sets of
conditions under which the condition of the Lemma is met and therefore a positive critical mass
results. Firstly, when network goods have no intrinsic (non-network) value, i.e., k = 0, then the
last term in equation (7) is zero. In markets with network externalities, limn→0 f′ > 0 and δ >
0, therefore the whole expression of (7) is positive. This is the most straightforward case and
applies directly to all two-way networks, such as telephone and fax networks.11
Secondly, a network has a positive critical mass if it exhibits very strong marginal
network externalities when it is small, i.e., if limn→0 h′(n) = limn→0 δf′(n) is sufficiently large.
Then the first term in (7) dominates irrespectively of the values of other parameters. In particular
it applies even when the goods have intrinsic value (k > 0). For example, the value of a
specialized computer program that relies mainly on support from other users can increase
significantly when even few other users are added. Another good example is a newsgroup on
internet with a very specialized subject.
Thirdly, a network has a positive critical mass if the density of high valuation types is
sufficiently large (i.e., G′(1) is large). Then, even if the marginal network externality is low, and
11 See Economides and White (1994) for a discussion of two-way networks.
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even if the network good has value in a network of size zero, the high density of consumers that
flock to the network when it is almost of zero size allows for larger networks to be supported
by higher prices, and therefore for a positive critical mass to arise. A good example of such a
good is computer software with large sales but small externality for each unit sold.
Conversely, critical mass is zero if limn→0 dp(n, n)/dn < 0. Inspection of (7) shows that
this can be achieved only if k > 0, i.e., only if the good has some positive value even when the
network is of zero size.
In a typical two-way network, k = 0. It follows that:
Corollary 1: Two-way networks exhibit critical mass under perfect competition.
3.2 Welfare Maximization
A planner who maximizes social welfare can fully internalize the network externality.
The social welfare function is
W(n, n) = B(n, n) - C(n) = ∫0n (p(q, n) - c)dq
where the gross benefit of a network is B(n, n) = ∫0n p(q, n)dq and costs are C(n) = ∫0n cdq = cn.
If W(n, n) is concave in n,12 the planner’s optimum is defined by the first order condition
dW/dn = dB(n, n)/dn - c = p(n, n) + ∫0n p2(q, n) dq - c = 0 (8)
Further, since p2(q, n) = h′(n)G-1(1 - q) > 0, it follows that ∫0n p2 dq > 0. Comparing (8) with
(5), we see that, since ∫0n p2 dq > 0 and W(n, n) is concave, the planner will choose a larger
network size than the market equilibrium under perfect competition for any cost c.
Three observations are in order. First, the marginal social benefit of network expansion
is larger than the benefit that accrues to a particular firm under perfect competition. Thus, in
12 W(n, n) is concave in n if p1 + 2p2 + ∫0n (p21 + p22) dq < 0.
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Figure 2(a) curve dB(n, n)/dn lies everywhere above p(n, n). This is a direct consequence of
the fact the planner can internalize the network externality while perfect competition cannot.
Second, all networks that have a critical mass under perfect competition will also have a critical
mass under welfare maximization. This is because
limn→0 dB(n, n)/dn = limn→0 p(n, n) + limn→0 δf′(n)G-1(1 - n) > limn→0 p(n, n).
and the last term is positive for every network that exhibits critical mass under perfect
competition. Third, if a network has a critical mass under welfare maximization, its critical mass
is larger than the critical mass under perfect competition. Let nW be the critical mass of the
welfare maximization problem, defined by d2B(n, n)/dn2 = d[p(n, n) + ∫0n p2 dq]/dn = 0. Since
the critical mass under perfect competition, n0, is defined by dp(n, n)/dn = 0, concavity of W
in n implies that nW > n0. Further, the marginal value of the welfare-maximizing network at
its critical mass is larger than the price of perfect competition at its critical mass. That is, the
maximum of dB(n ,n)/dn exceeds the maximum of dp(n,n)/dn. See Figure 2(a).
Combining these three effects, we observe that the social planner starts a network at a
higher marginal cost than would a system of perfect competition. Its starting size (the network’s
critical mass) will be larger, and the network size will remain larger for all smaller marginal costs
than the network supported by perfectly competitive market.
Theorem 2: A welfare-maximizing planner starts a network at a higher marginal
cost than a system of perfect competitors. Thus, for some range of marginal costs,
a welfare maximizing planner supports a network of positive size, while under
perfect competition the network does not exist. The starting size of the welfare-
maximizing network (its critical mass) is larger than in perfect competition, and it
remains larger for smaller marginal costs.
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It follows trivially that
Corollary 2: Perfect Competition is inefficient. It provides networks of smaller than
optimal sizes.
It is possible for the welfare maximizing network to exhibit positive critical mass, even
when there is no positive critical mass under perfect competition. Such a case is shown in Figure
2(b), and it is a direct consequence of the fact that the social marginal benefit exceeds the private
marginal benefit.
Corollary 3: The welfare-maximizing solution may exhibit a positive critical mass,
even when there is no positive critical mass under perfect competition.
3.3 Monopoly
We can conceive of two different problems for a monopolist. In the first, the monopolist
does not influence expectations. In the second, which is more interesting, the monopolist
influences expectations. The problem of the monopolist who influences expectations (and thereby
the size of the demand) is to maximize profits
ΠM(n, n) = RM(n) - C(n) = n(p(n, n) - c). (9)
Its first order condition is13
dΠM/dn = MRM - MC = p(n, n) + ndp/dn - c = p(n, n) + n(p1 + p2) - c = 0 (10)
13 ΠM(n, n) is concave in n if d2ΠM/dn2 = 2dp(n, n)/dn + nd2p(n, n)/dn2 = 2(p1 + p2) +
n(p11 + p22 + 2p12) < 0.
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since MRM = p(n, n) + ndp/dn = p(n, n) + n(p1 + p2). Clearly, this differs from perfect
competition (equation (5)) depending on the sign of the term dp/dn = p1 + p2. The earlier
section on perfect competition provides an extensive analysis of the shape of the function p(n,n).
When the network exhibits positive critical mass under perfect competition, p(n, n) increases for
small n up to n = n0, and decreases thereafter. At a network of critical mass size, n = n0, the
marginal revenue of the monopolist is equal to the willingness to pay for the marginal consumer;
i.e., it is equal to price. Therefore, at that point the first order conditions of the monopolist and
the perfectly competitive firms coincide. It follows that, for marginal cost c0 = p(n0, n0) the
monopolist also chooses a network of size n0.
For c > c0, the solution of the first order condition of the monopolist will be smaller than
n0. However, in this cost range, the willingness to pay at the network size that the monopolist
is willing to provide is smaller than marginal cost, since from (10),
p(n, n) - c = - ndp(n, n)/dn, (11)
and this is negative because dp(n, n)/dn > 0 for n < n0. Therefore the monopolist provides no
services for c > c0. Thus, when the network exhibits critical mass under perfect competition,
the monopolist starts the network at the same marginal cost c0 and at the same critical mass
n0 as in perfect competition. For smaller costs, c < c0, the monopolist provides a smaller
network than perfect competition. The monopolist’s network size as a function of marginal cost
is shown in a bold line in Figure 2(a). The range of MRM over which the monopolist stays
closed is shown as a dotted line. Once the network size n is determined, price is given by the
demand line p(n, n). Prices are of course higher than the perfectly competitive price (equal to
marginal cost).14
14 This is immediate from (11) since for c < c0 we have n > n0 and dp(n, n)/dn < 0.
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If the network exhibits no critical mass under perfect competition and dp(n, n)/dn < 0
for all n, the monopolist will choose a lower network size and a higher price than perfect
competition for all costs, as shown by the bold line in Figure 2(b).15
Theorem 3: A monopolist who can influence expectations will generally choose a
smaller network size and charge a higher price than under perfect competition. The
critical mass of the monopolist coincides with that of perfect competition. At that
critical mass only, the monopolist prices at marginal cost; then at that point only,
the behavior of the monopolist coincides with perfect competition.
Corollary 4: Despite his influence on expectations, a monopolist who influences
expectations supports a network which is smaller and more inefficient than perfect
competition from a social welfare point of view.
The interesting result here is that the monopolist never supports a network of larger size
than perfect competition despite the fact that he can influence expectations and thereby internalize
the network externality. The influence on expectations creates an incentive to expand the
network, but this is more than counterbalanced by the usual incentive of a monopolist to restrict
production. In equilibrium, the monopolist operates a network only where his marginal revenue
falls below price; otherwise, equating marginal cost and marginal revenue would lead to losses.
Marginal revenue falls below price for network sizes where the influence on expectations is
superseded by the negative slope of the demand curve. And in this range, the size of the network
of the monopolist is smaller than under perfect competition. Of course, a perfectly price
discriminating monopolist would have been able to implement a pricing scheme that would
15 Of course, provided that the profit function of the monopolist is concave.
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internalize the externalities. An advantage that a monopolist may have over perfect competition
is the higher likelihood of reaching the n > 0 rather the n = 0 equilibrium. The monopolist
who influences expectations can create the necessary coordination to reach a positive network
size, while coordination among competing firms may be difficult.
The problem of a monopolist who cannot influence expectations is even more
straightforward. He maximizes
Π(n, ne) = n(p(n, ne) - c). (12)
His first order condition evaluated at ne = n is
∂Π/∂n = p(n, n) + np1 - c = p(n, n) - nh(n)G′(G-1(1 - n)) - c = 0. (13)
Comparing (13) with (10), it is clear that the monopolist who does not influence expectations will
restrict the size of the network even further than the monopolist who influences expectations.
Theorem 4: A monopolist who does not influence expectations supports a smaller
network than the monopolist who can influence expectations.
Corollary 5: From a social welfare point of view, the choice of a monopolist who
does not influence expectations is more inefficient than that of a monopolist who
influences expectations.
3.4 Oligopoly Within a Network of Homogeneous Compatible Goods
Oligopoly on network goods can take a variety of forms. First, oligopolists may produce
the same good on the network and compete in quantities. Then each firm reaps the network
externality of the whole network. Second, oligopolists may produce differentiated but compatible
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goods; again each reaps the network externality of the whole network. Third, some firm(s) may
choose to produce goods that are incompatible with goods of other producers. Fourth, there may
be incompatible differentiated goods. In the case of total or partial incompatibility, the set of
firms is partitioned according to the compatibility standard adhered to by its members, and each
reaps the network externality of the group to which it belongs. We will now consider only the
case where firms produce compatible goods, and we will assume that firms choose quantities
non-cooperatively.16 The models of perfect competition as well as the present model of
compatible components are most appropriate for the application to the fax market in section 4.5.
Let the expectation of production of firm i, i = 1, ..., n, be nie, and actual production be
ni. The total expected size of the network is Σi nie, and the network externality is h(Σi nie). The
willingness to pay for type y, given these expectations, is yh(Σi nie). Firms i and j are both in
business if firms quote equal prices, because yh(Σi nie) - pi = yh(Σi nie) - pj ⇔ pi = pj. Calling
p the common price, the marginal consumer y* buying the good is defined by
y* = m(p, h(Σi nie)) = p/h(Σi nie), (14)
which is similar to equation (1). Since consumers of indices higher than y* buy the good, the
size of the network (demand) at price p is Σi ni = 1 - G(y*), or equivalently,
Σi ni = 1 - G(p/h(Σi nie)). (15)
Since G(.) is strictly monotonic, we can write the willingness to pay of the last consumer in a
network of size Σi ni and expectations Σi nie as
p(Σi ni, Σi nie) = h(Σi nie)G-1(1 - Σi ni). (16)
Firm j chooses nj to maximize
16 The analysis in a model of differentiated compatible goods would be similar. Competition
among incompatible networks is qualitatively different; it is the subject of current work in
Economides and Flyer (1995).
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Πj = nj[p(Σi ni, Σi nie) - c].
As in monopoly, there are two possible problems under oligopoly. In the first, oligopolists do
not influence expectations. In the second, each oligopolist influences its expected output through
its quantity choice. We turn to this problem first. The jth oligopolist sets nje = nj before
maximizing profits. Then, its objective is
Πj = nj[p(Σi ni, nj+Σi≠j nie) - c].
Its first order condition is
dΠj/nj = MRj - MC = p(Σi ni, nj+Σi≠j nie) + njdp/dnj - c
= p(Σi ni, nj+Σi≠j nie) + nj(p1 + p2) - c = 0. (17)
At equilibrium expectations are fulfilled, so that nie = ni, for all i.
Clearly, for network size n0 (where p1 + p2 = 0), the first order condition of oligopoly
coincides with that of perfectly competitive firms and of a monopolist who influences
expectations. Therefore, at marginal cost c0 = p(n0, n0), the size of a network of oligopolists is
n0 and coincides with that of perfect competition and monopoly. For c > c0, oligopolists would
choose a network of size Σi ni < n0. However, for these costs, the oligopoly price would fall
below marginal cost,
p(Σi ni, Σi ni) - c = - nj(p1 + p2) < 0, (18)
because p1 + p2 > 0 for Σi ni < n0. Therefore oligopolists will not produce for c > c0.
For c < c0, the marginal revenue for oligopolist j falls between the marginal revenue of
a perfectly competitive firm and of the monopolist who influences expectations (if they were
operating a network of the same size),
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MRM < MRj < p ⇔ p + (Σi ni)(p1 + p2) < p + nj(p1 + p2) < p. (19)
MRj is shown in Figure 2 between MRM and p(n, n). Thus, oligopolists that influence
expectations choose an equilibrium network size that lies between the perfectly competitive size
and the network size of a monopolist who influences expectations.
Theorem 5: Cournot competition among oligopolists on the same network who are
able to influence expectations of their own output results in an equilibrium network
size that lies between the perfectly competitive size and the size chosen by a
monopolist who influences expectations.
Corollary 6: From a social welfare point of view, the equilibrium of oligopolists that
influence expectations is more inefficient than the perfectly competitive outcome but
more efficient than the choice of a monopolist who influences expectations.
An oligopolist who cannot influence expectations has marginal profit (evaluated at nie =
ni)
dΠj/nj = p(Σi ni, Σi ni) + njp1 - c. (20)
This is smaller than the marginal profit of the oligopolist who influences expectations because
it does not include the positive term njp2. Thus, oligopolists who do not influence expectations
support a smaller network than their counterparts who influence expectations. It is also easy to
show that oligopolists who do not influence expectations support a larger network than a
monopolist who does not influence expectations.
In summary, perfect competition, monopoly, and oligopoly of compatible goods exhibit
the same critical mass size. Thus, in each of these markets the network starts with the same
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coverage and at the same marginal cost. The expansion of the network as marginal cost
decreases follows slower rates for oligopoly and monopoly.
4. Dynamic Industry Model under Perfect Competition
In this section, we focus on dynamic models of markets for network goods under perfect
competition that are suitable for examining the behavior of markets in which the marginal cost
of production declines over time. The assumption of declining marginal costs is motivated by
the observation that production costs for the new goods typically decline over time due to
declining costs of inputs and technological progress (process innovation or learning by doing).
The dynamic model assumes an exogenous time path for the marginal cost of production and
solves for the equilibrium time paths of prices and quantities (network sizes). In section 4.1, the
equilibrium time path for the network size is characterized by a discrete jump to the level of the
critical mass of the network once the marginal cost of production falls to given level.
In section 4.2, we introduce a finitely elastic supply curve. This rules out infinitely large
instantaneous supply. The model with finitely elastic supply also implies that rational consumers
rule out the possibility of discontinuous growth paths in their expectations, thereby reducing the
set of feasible equilibria. Thus, the set of equilibrium time paths is reduced to a single path
which is uniquely determined by the initial size of the network (zero in this case).
We want to give quantitative content to the qualitative prediction that network
externalities result in "rapid growth". If we were to observe a time path in which the network
size were growing at an explosive rate, this would be consistent with the existence of network
externalities, but observationally indistinguishable from plausible diffusion or growth models in
which externalities play no role. Hence, a second virtue of the model below is that it
encompasses a standard diffusion model as a special case, thereby providing a framework in
which the model structure can used to identify the externality effect. The solution to the model
depends on a parameter that indexes the strength of the externality effect, where a value of zero
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implies no consumption externality. If data are available on prices, quantities, and the
distribution of types, then this parameter is identified in the econometric sense. Thus, the
structural model gives positive content to the quantitative predictions of the model.
We discuss facsimile (fax) machines as an example of a network good that has shown
dramatic expansion in the 80’s. Although faxes predate the telegraph, their importance increased
dramatically with the introduction of the G2 transmission standard in 1979-80. Still, sales did
not pick up until the falling costs of semiconductors and integrated circuits decreased production
costs of fax machines in the early 80’s. We argue that production costs eventually reached a
critical point at which significant network effects were enabled and price equilibria came into
existence. Simple plots of the time series for prices and quantities reveal explosive growth
during the mid-80’s following a rapid decline in prices, thus seeming to confirm this prediction
of the model. As our fax example indicates, there are many instances where it is not empirically
accurate to treat the network good as non-durable.17 Since many other network goods like
computer software have similarly long service lives, we include in section 4.3 an extension of
the model to accommodate durable goods.
4.1 Infinitely Elastic Supply
It is straightforward to extend the static model under perfect competition to a dynamic
framework. In contrast to the static case, we now assume that consumers form expectations over
the present value and future time paths of the network size ne(t) and the price of the (non-
durable) network good pe(t). We assume that these expectations are formed taking into account
the expected future time path of industry marginal cost c(t), and that these expectations are
formed rationally and held in common.
17 Fax usage has both durable and non-durable components. The machine is durable, but
phone services and fax paper are non-durable. In a full empirical implementation, it would be
desirable and advantageous to model the joint decision since such a model could make use of
aggregate data on fax paper consumption in addition to machine purchases.
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Let instantaneous utility of owning the network good for consumer type y and network
of size n be given by u(y, n). Since the good is non-durable, the consumer’s consumption
problem is static. Thus, the marginal consumer y*(t) is characterized by a straightforward
extension of equation (1), namely
y*(t) = m(pe(t), ne(t)) = pe(t)/h(ne(t)). (21)
Summing over individual demands (i.e., the density of individuals with type less than y*(t)), total
market demand for the network good at time t is given by
n(t) = 1 - G(pe(t)/h(ne(t))). (22)
Under the assumption of infinitely elastic and perfectly competitive supply, the inverse supply
function is given by setting price equal to marginal costs: p(t) = c(t). Thus, under the
assumptions of market clearing and rational expectations, equilibrium prices are determined
trivially by marginal costs, and the equilibrium network size is implicitly defined by the
functional equation
n(t) = 1 - G(c(t)/h(n(t))). (23)
The solution to this equation can be characterized using results in Cabral (1990). His
"benefit flow" function B is defined here in terms of our primitives as
B(y, n, t) = u(y, n(t)) - p(t). (24)
It is easy to verify that our benefit function satisfies the conditions assumed in Cabral. In
particular, our benefit function is continuously differentiable, satisfies By > 0, Bn > 0, and Bt
> 0, and the distribution of types G(y) is smooth. Therefore, it follows from Cabral (1990) that
there are multiple equilibria, and that equilibrium adoption paths n(t) are discontinuous. The
multiplicity of equilibria is analogous to the multiplicity found in the static model discussed
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earlier, and the discontinuity of n(t) confirms the conjecture formed using the intuition from the
static model at the beginning of the previous section.
4.2 Finitely Elastic Supply
While the multiplicity of equilibria is not an uncommon result in models of this sort18
(and can be remedied in an ad hoc way by introducing a selection rule), the discontinuity of the
time path is empirically counterfactual. This is because it implies an infinite instantaneous rate
of supply at the discontinuity. In this section, we address both the multiplicity and discontinuity
of equilibria by introducing a finitely elastic supply curve.19 Intuitively, this modification rules
out discrete jumps in equilibrium since such jumps could only be supported by infinite prices.
A second desirable implication of this assumption is that the set of multiple equilibria is reduced
to a single time path.
We introduce an imperfectly elastic supply curve by assuming that the marginal cost of
supply c(t, n′(t)) is upward sloping in the instantaneous rate of supply, so that cn′>0. The
equilibrium price path is then solved by setting p(t) = c(t, n′(t)), and the equilibrium time path
for the network size is implicitly defined by the ordinary differential equation
n(t) = 1 - G(c(t, n′(t))/h(n(t))). (25)
Though non-linear, the existence, uniqueness, and continuity properties of the solutions to the
differential equation in (25) are standard results. A closed-form expression for the solution is
not generally available, but we can compute solutions using standard techniques from numerical
analysis. Some examples of numerical solutions are provided below in section 4.4.
18 See also Howitt and McAfee (1988).
19 The effects of this assumption can actually be made quite weak, since we can force the
slope of this function to be infinitesimally small.
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4.3 Durable Goods
We now extend the model by considering durable goods. Let the instantaneous utility of
owning the network good for a consumer of type y and a network of size n be given by u(y,
n). Assume for simplicity that once a good is purchased, it yields an infinite stream of future
utility. Thus, given an expected future time path of network size ne(t), the present value of a
machine purchase at time t for a consumer of type y is given by
V(y, t, ne(t)) = ∫t∞ e-ρs u(y, ne(s))ds, (26)
where ρ is the discount rate.
Suppose that the durable good is offered at time t at price p(t). If it is purchased at
time t, the present value of its cost is
q(t) = e-ρt p(t). (27)
Consumers choose to purchase the good at time t* to maximize the objective function V(y, t,
ne(t)) - q(t). Assuming that this function is concave (over the relevant range), t* is characterized
by20
V′(y, t*, ne(t*)) - q′(t*) = 0. (28)
This expression simplifies to21
u(y, ne(t*)) = ρp(t*) - p′(t*) ≡ λ(t*). (29)
This equation implicitly defines the optimal purchase date t* for a consumer of type y.
Alternatively, we can use this equation to implicitly define the index value y* of the consumer
who, given the expected price and network size paths, is just indifferent to purchasing a machine
20 We further assume that there exists a compact domain of t such that V(y, t, ne(t)) > 0.
21 V′ - q′ = -e-ρtu(y, ne(t)) + ρe-ρtp(t) - e-ρtp′(t) = 0, so that u(y, ne(t)) = ρp(t*) - p′(t*).
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at time t. We denote the function so defined by m(p(t), ne(t), t). That is, this function denotes
the index value of the marginal consumer. Consumers for whom y > m(p(t),ne(t),t) have
already purchased the durable good at time t. Thus, the network size n at time t is given by
integrating the unit demands of these consumers:
n(t) = ∫∞m(p(t), ne(t), t) dG(y) = 1 - G(m(p(t), ne(t), t)). (30)
Suppose now that the instantaneous consumer utility function is multiplicative in types,
i.e., u(y, n) = yh(n). Then we can use equation (29) to solve for the function m:
m(p(t), ne(t), t) = λ(t)/h(ne(t)). (31)
This in turn allows to write the demand equation (30) as
n(t) = 1 - G(λ(t)/h(ne(t))). (32)
The shadow price λ(t)
λ(t) ≡ ρp(t) - p′(t), (33)
plays exactly the same role in equation (32) as price p(t) plays in equation (2).22 In the
durable goods case, λ(t) represents the opportunity cost of buying the good at t rather than
t + dt. The first term ρp(t) measures the cost of waiting one period, assuming that the price
remains the same. The second term reduces the cost of buying today by any price increase in
the time increment dt. Thus, λ(t) represents the opportunity cost of buying today rather than
tomorrow. Using this re-interpretation, we can apply and extend results from the non-durable
analysis to the durable good case.
22 λ(t) = ρp(t) - p′(t) is monotonic if λ′(t) = ρp′(t) - p′′(t) < 0. For this it is sufficient that
p(t) is decreasing and convex.
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In the dynamic setting, a fulfilled expectations equilibrium is a pair of paths of prices and
sales {p(t), n(t)} such that expectations are fulfilled and supply equals demand at every period,
i.e., it fulfills:
demand: nD(t) = 1 - G(pe(t)/h(ne(t)),
supply: p(t) = c(t, nS′(t)),
fulfilled expectations of sales: n(t) = ne(t),
fulfilled expectations of prices: p(t) = pe(t),
market clearing: nD(t) = nS(t) = n(t),
where c(t, nS′(t)) is the marginal cost at time t which may depend on the size of output nS′(t)
at t. In the next section, we apply this dynamic analysis to the fax market in the U.S.
As in the model for non-durable goods, we modify the model of durable goods by
postulating a finitely elastic supply. In contrast to the non-durable goods model, the equilibrium
growth path with this modification is described by a second order rather than first order
differential equation. Imposing the market clearing condition under perfect competition (price
equal to marginal cost), we get p(t) = c(t, n′(t)). Hence, p′ = ct + cn′n′′. This implies
λ(t) = ρc(t, n′(t)) - ct(t, n′(t)) + cn′(t, n′(t))n′′(t). (34)
Substituting this expression for λ(t) into equation (32) yields the desired result. The existence,
uniqueness, and continuity properties of the solution to this differential equation are standard
results. Given two transversality conditions, this solution is unique. In the fax calibration of
section 4.5 we use conditions n(0) = 0, n′(0)= 0. Although this is appropriate for most networks,
these conditions need to be modified for networks, such as the Internet, that enter market
competition after they have accumulated significant coverage and a high rate of growth.
4.4 A Numerical Example
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Because the nonlinear differential equations derived in the previous section do not have
closed-form solutions, we illustrate the model by reporting numerical solutions to a representative
problem. In particular, we assume the following functional forms and parameter values for the
above model with finitely elastic and perfectly competitive supply:
u(y, n) = yh(n)
h(n) = k + δnα α = 0.5, k = 0.1, δ = 1.0.
G(y) = ey - µ/(1 + ey - µ) µ = 5.0
c(t, n′) = e-t + dn′ d = 1.0
The above assumptions are fairly standard. The assumption that the network has positive
utility when the network size is zero describes, for example, a good like a computer operating
system, where the good provides utility even in the absence of a network. It could also describe
a good like a fax machine that can also function as a telephone. The utility of the good
obviously depends also on the size of the network, and we have chosen an exponential utility
function. The distribution of types is symmetric and chosen for its analytic convenience. Setting
µ = 5.0 implies that virtually all consumer types receive at least some benefit from the good.
Finally, the industry marginal cost c(t, n′) is linear in output with a slope of one, but is shifting
downward over time according to e-t.
With these functional form assumptions, the differential equation governing the growth
of the network is
n′ = (k + δ√n)(µ + log(1 - n) - log(n)) - e-t (35)
Note that if we let δ = 0, this equation provides a model for growth in which the size of the
market grows over time solely because of the decrease in prices.23 If δ = 1, so that externality
effects are present, then the growth rate of the market is clearly higher, and increasing in n.
23 There are no other diffusion effects included here. For example, the model does not allow
demonstration effects.
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Figure 3 presents numerical simulations of the equilibrium growth paths with and without
externality effects. When δ = 0, the growth path tends to inherit the smooth s-shaped form of
the distribution of types. In contrast, the growth path with δ = 1 displays a much steeper slope
and reaches the maximum network size much faster. Additional simulations not shown here also
confirm that as the slope of the industry supply curve approaches zero, the slope of the growth
path over the initial region approaches infinity.
These numerical simulations illustrate
Figure 3: Diffusion of an innovation with and
without network externalities.
that the identification of network externality
effects in data will rely heavily on the a
priori assumptions about functional forms.
The most important assumption of these is the
distribution of types. In practice, an index of
types could be constructed from a vector of
buyer characteristics by estimating a discrete
choice model.24 This model could then be
combined with demographic data on the
distribution of characteristics in order to
compute the distribution of types over time. That is, such data would allow us to obtain an
estimate of the function G(y). This knowledge of functional form would enable us to estimate
the externality parameters δ and α using time series data on market prices and quantities.
4.5 Demand Calibrations for the U.S. Market for Facsimile Machines
24 See the discussion in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
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The market for facsimile machines in the U.S. exploded during the mid-to-late 80s, with
growth rates of the number of units shipped exceeding 150% in 1987.25 We argue that this
tremendous surge in demand was not driven as much by outside shifts in consumer demand and
price reductions as it was by the "feedback" effect induced by both past increases and anticipated
future increases in the size of the installed base. The anecdotal evidence is consistent with this
interpretation since the most dramatic fall in prices occurred well before 1987 (see Figure 4).
What is true about the previous year (1986), however, is that this is the year in which the rate
at which prices were falling began to taper off. This is an important clue because in the
consumer’s solution to the dynamic, durable goods problem, the desire to postpone a purchase
is proportional to λt = ρp(t) - p′(t). This implies that as long as prices are still falling (that is,
as long as p′(t) < 0), aggregate demand is weak. This is exactly what the data in Figure 4 seem
to show.
We now formalize the above intuition with a simple calibration exercise. In addition to
our data on the average prices and quantities of facsimile machines sold in the U.S. between
1979 and 1992, empirical estimation of our model requires data on the distribution of consumer
characteristics. Ideally, these characteristics would be identified by collecting marketing data on
consumers that purchase fax machines and then using these data to estimate a discrete choice
model. In practice, however, access to such data is difficult, so we pursue an alternative strategy
that is feasible with aggregate data. Even though most fax purchases are made by firms and not
consumers, we argue that it is nonetheless reasonable and convenient to model the unit demand
for fax machines as a function of consumer characteristics. This is because a firm’s demand for
fax machines ultimately is derived from "employee demand." For example, a firm with a high
fraction of highly skilled white collar workers will have a higher demand for fax machines than
a firm with a high fraction of production line workers. For simplicity and feasibility, we assume
25 The data we use was obtained from various issues of the Predicast Basebook.
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that the employee characteristics related to fax demand can be summarized by employees’
Figure 4
income.
In order to characterize the distribution of consumer types as a function of consumer
income, we use data on the distribution of income from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for
survey years 1976, 1981, 1986, and 1991. Since income is approximately lognormal, we
transform the data using natural log to obtain normally distributed log-income. We then calculate
the mean and variance for each of the above four years and then interpolate to estimate the
distribution of log-income for each year between 1979 and 1992.26 This gives us a time-varying
26 To be specific, this procedure also requires that we account for top coding in the CPS.
For each of the four years, we truncate above at $100,000, except for 1976, which is truncated
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estimate of the distribution function described in section 3, that is, G(y; t). We use the notation
µt and σt to denote the mean and standard deviation of log income, and the notation Φ(x) to
denote the standard normal distribution. This notation allows us to represent our empirical
estimate of G by
G(y; t) = Φ((ln(y) - µt)/σt). (36)
Next we normalize the size of the fax network by assuming that maximum potential
network size is 20 million fax machines. This number implies a maximum ratio of about one
fax machine for every five workers in the U.S. (we estimate the number of fax machines in 1992
to be about 7.6 million). In the results reported below, we experimented with both larger and
smaller values of the maximum network size and this did not affect the calibration results
reported below. To construct the "stock" of fax machines, that is, the installed base, we assume
that fax machines depreciate at a rate of 13.3% per year, and used a perpetual inventory method
to accumulate unit sales.27 Finally, we deflated our price series for fax machines using the GDP
deflator reported in Table 1.1 of the Current Survey of Business.
With the above estimate of the distribution of consumer income G(y; t), our data on
normalized network size, nt, and real prices, pt, we calibrate the model by choosing values of the
above at $80,000. We also truncate below at $2000 in order to avoid data problems with
outliers. We then use formulas for the truncated mean and variance of a normal distribution to
calculate means of log income (nominal) of 9.33, 9.38, 9.70, and 9.73 for the four years,
respectively. The standard deviations of income in these four years are 1.18, 1.27, 1.31, and
1.33, respectively. The interpolation is done using a cubic polynomial. Finally we converted
these numbers to real 1987 dollars using the GDP deflator reported in Table 1.1 of the Survey
of Current Business. We are extremely grateful to our colleague Rick Flyer for providing us with
the estimates from the CPS.
27 We experimented with various depreciation rates and this did not significantly affect
the calibration results reported below. We chose the depreciation rate of 13.3% by applying the
average service life of telephones (7.5 years), which is estimated using life expectancy tables for
consumer possessions used by insurance adjusters in responding to claims for fire and theft
damage. We are grateful to Peter Klenow for providing us with this estimate.
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remaining unknown parameters to fit the model. We simplify the model somewhat by assuming
that fax machines are pure network goods, so that they give no utility in a network of size zero.
That is, we assume k = 0. This is not strictly true, since fax machines can also double as
telephones, but given the widespread availability of telephones in most places where fax
machines are used, it seems reasonable to assume that the fax machines are valued only for their
ability to make fax transmissions.
We relax the simplifying assumption made in the previous section that γ = 1. Thus, our
general Cobb-Douglas utility specification is
u(yt, net) = Aytγnt-1α. (37)
Note that we have made the assumption net = nt-1, that is, our empirical specification assumes
that the expected size of the network this year is a linear function of the network size at the
beginning of the year.28
Recalling our use of the notation λt = ρpt - pt′, we construct a data series for λt by
assuming ρ = 0.2. Our results in the previous section show that the value of the marginal
consumer is calculated by setting utility equal to λt and solving for yt. Taking natural logs of
the resulting expression yields
ln yt = γ-1(ln λt - αln nt-1 - ln A). (38)
Using our empirical estimate of the distribution of consumer income, the equilibrium network
size is given by
nt = 1 - Φ((ln yt - µt)/σt). (39)
Inverting Φ and solving this expression for ln(yt) yields
28 Imposing a coefficient of one is arbitrary and reflects the fact that the constant term A
absorbs this scaling factor in any case.
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σtΦ-1(1 - nt) + µt = ln yt. (40)
Since the inverse of the cumulative standard normal is easily calculated, and since σt, nt, and µt
are observable, we can construct the term on right side of the above expression. We define this
variable using the notation gt = σtΦ-1(1 - nt) + µt. Finally, substituting our expression for the
marginal consumer yields our estimating equation
gt = β0 + β1 lnλt + β2ln nt-1 + et (41)
where β0 = - γ-1ln A, β1 = γ-1, β2 = - γ-1α, and et is an error term that represents
approximation errors in the functional form assumptions as well as errors in the measurement
of gt.
We estimate this equation using OLS. We point out that equation (41) is essentially a
demand equation in which a nonlinear transformation of the quantity variable appears on the left
side of the equation and a price term (λt) and a demand shifter (nt-1) appear on the right side of
the equation.29 Table 1 reports the estimates of the model for three variations of the above
specification. For Model 1, the estimates reveal a positive coefficient on the price term, as
predicted, and a negative coefficient on the network term, also as predicted. Both coefficients
(as well as the coefficient estimates reported for models 2 and 3) are estimated with tight
standard errors, although we hasten to emphasize that these standard error estimates can be
misleading given the small size of our sample. We include them merely to provide some
indication of the model’s fit. We note that goodness of the calibration fit is also revealed by the
high R2 value of 0.902.
Table 1: Calibration Estimates
29 Our OLS estimates are potentially biased for the usual reason that the error term et could
contain shocks to supply, in which case the price term would be endogenous. Given our data
limitations, we ignore this issue.
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Time ... ... 0.008
(0.015)
# Obs 15 14 14
Adj. R2 0.902 0.951 0.947
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.
The coefficient estimates for models 2 and 3 largely confirm the results for model 1, and
reveal them to be fairly robust to alternative assumptions. In model 2, we lag the price term
ln(λt) to control for endogeneity. As expected, this slightly increases the coefficient on the price
term, but the magnitude of the increase is not dramatic. Model 3 augments model 2 by adding
a trend term. A significant trend would have indicated the possibility of a specification error,
but the estimate here is insignificant.
Our structural specification of the empirical model allows us to interpret the coefficients
on the price and network variables in terms of the preference and technology parameters of the
model. Recall that the utility of the network for a consumer indexed by income level yt is
given by u(yt, net) = Aytγnt-1α. Table 2 reports the estimates and standard errors of α and γ
implied by the reduced-form estimates in Table 1. The estimates of α range from 4.056 to
4.923, with standard errors of 1.171 and 2.023 respectively. These estimates provide a structural
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estimate of the utility attributable to the size of the installed base; the estimated market demand
for fax machines is increasing in the size of the installed base.30
Table 2: Structural Parameters













Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we discussed the equilibrium size of networks under alternative market
structures for both non-durable and for durable goods. In the presence of network externalities,
we showed that, in a static model, for high marginal costs the size of network is zero; as costs
fall, the network size abruptly increases to a positive and significant size (the critical mass) and
thereafter it increases gradually as costs continue to fall. A welfare-maximizing planner supports
a larger network than in perfect competition. Despite its influence on consumers’ expectations,
a monopolist always chooses a network of smaller size than in perfect competition. Oligopolists
30 These estimates imply that consumer utility is convex in the size of the installed base.
While this does not violate the assumptions of our model, most of the theoretical literature
assumes that utility is concave in the size of the network. One possible explanation for this result
is that our estimate of 1/γ (the coefficient on the price term ln(λt)) is biased downward by
measurement error, in which case our estimate of α is biased upward. When we simultaneously
include both current and lagged values of the price term (not reported in the table), the sum of
the price coefficients rises to 0.21, the coefficient on the network effect drops to 0.50, and the
implied exponent of the installed base falls to α = 2.5. This sensitivity to price specifications
suggests that future generalizations of the model and better measurement of the price term will
lead to better estimates of the utility parameters.
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of compatible goods support networks of smaller size than perfect competition but larger than
monopoly.
We generalized these results to a dynamic multi-period setting and to durable goods under
perfect competition. In this framework, given a slightly inelastic supply curve, the abrupt
increase of the network from zero to critical mass of the single-period model is replaced by a
continuous but steep increase in network size. We applied our model to US fax market.




Antonelli, Cristiano, (1992), "The Economic Theory of Information Networks," in The Economics
of Information Networks, Cristiano Antonelli (ed.), North Holland: Amsterdam.
Arthur, W. Brian, (1988), "Self-reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics," in P. Anderson and K.
Arrow (eds.) The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, Addison Wesley.
Arthur, W. Brian, (1990), "Positive Feedbacks in the Economy," Scientific American, February
1990, pp. 92-99.
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes, (1995), "Automobile Prices in Market
Equilibrium," forthcoming, Econometrica.
Cabral, Luis, (1990), "On the Adoption of Innovations with ’Network’ Externalities,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 19, pp. 229-308.
Cabral, Luis, and Antonio Leita, (1989), "Network Consumption Externalities: The Case of
Portuguese Telex Service," in The Economics of Information Networks, Cristiano
Antonelli (ed.), North Holland, 1992, pp. 129-40.
Economides, Nicholas, (1996a), "The Economics of Networks," forthcoming International
Journal of Industrial Organization.
Economides, Nicholas, (1996b), "Network Externalities, Complementarities, and Invitations to
Enter," forthcoming European Journal of Political Economy.
Economides, Nicholas and Rick Flyer, (1995), "Technical Standards Coalitions for Network
Goods," mimeo.
Economides, Nicholas and Lawrence J. White, (1994), "Networks and Compatibility: Implications
for Antitrust," European Economic Review, vol. 38, pp. 651-662.
Farrell, Joseph and Saloner, Garth (1985), "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," Rand
Journal of Economics, vol. 16, pp. 70-83.
Hayashi, Koichiro, (1992), "From Network Externalities to Interconnection," in The Economics
of Information Networks, Cristiano Antonelli (ed.), North Holland: Amsterdam.
Howitt, Peter and Preston McAfee, (1988), "Stability of Equilibria with Externalities," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 103, pp. 261-77.
Katz, Michael and Carl Shapiro, (1985), "Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility,"
American Economic Review, vol. 75 (3), pp. 424-440.
Noam, Eli, (1992), "A Theory for the Instability of Public Telecommunications Systems," in The
Economics of Information Networks, Cristiano Antonelli (ed.), North Holland: Amsterdam.
Rohlfs, Jeffrey, (1974), "A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service,"
Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 5, pp. 16-37.
38
Wilson, Robert, (1993), Nonlinear Pricing, Oxford University Press.
